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STIMULATING ORGANIC FARMING VIA PUBLIC SERVICES AND 
AN AUCTION-BASED SUBSIDY  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In order to stimulate organic farming governments generally use a mix of temporary hectare payments 
and provision of public services for stimulating the development of the organic sector. In this paper a 
conceptual model is developed for determining a socially optimal hectare payment for any given level 
of public services. Farm heterogeneity, due to the variability of soil quality and management skills, is 
explicitly taken into account. Using an n-th price auction mechanism farmers indicate what their 
reservation subsidy is for a given level of public input provision. The outcome of this problem is 
utilized in the government’s optimization problem. We found that the level of per hectare socially 
optimal subsidy increases significantly with the elasticity of the social welfare function and decreases 
significantly with the degree of farmers’ heterogeneity in suitability of growing organic crops (OC) as 
well as with the level of complementary governmental services. The total area planted for OC is also 
quite sensitive to these parameters. The effects of the deadweight loss parameter and the degree of risk 
aversion on per hectare subsidy and on total organic acreage are relatively small. 
  
Keywords: auctions, organic farming, policy mix 
JEL classification: Q28, Q12 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years organic farming received considerable attention in European countries. In their 
search for a more sustainable agriculture, producers, consumers and policy makers rediscovered 
organic farming. The consumption and the number of producers increased rapidly in most countries, 
although total shares are still modest. Policy makers in a number of European countries came up with 
ambitious goals that the organic sector should attain. In the Netherlands for example, the government 
stated that in 2010 ten percent of total farmland should be used for organic farming (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 2004:11). In order to meet this objective the Dutch government 
also tries to stimulate the development of the organic sector with a mixture of different policy 
instruments. These policy instruments can be classified into two main categories: direct payments and 
the provision of public services. Direct payments are usually on a hectare basis and are given in the 
first years after switching to organic farming or during the period that a farm is still in transition. In the 
past these payments were meant as a compensation for losses in production during the first years of 
organic production. Starting from 2005 the emphasis in providing these subsidies is more on 
rewarding the positive externalities that arise from using organic methods. The public services 
provided consist among others of generic marketing activities, dissemination of information, publicly 
funded research, supporting market integration etc. See Marshall (1991) for an overview of different 
technical support measures with a public good nature. These services are typical public inputs. 
Individual farmers benefit from them, but individual organic farmers would never pay for them given 
the non-excludability and non-rivalry in using these inputs.  
Over the years the Dutch government made remarkable shifts in this policy mix. In 1994 a direct 
income payment per hectare for organic crop farmers in transition was introduced. The year 2002 was 
the last year this income support was given and support per hectare was also lower in this year. The 
reason for abolishing the hectare payment scheme was that the government wanted to stimulate the 
organic sector, but not via subsidies. Market perspectives should guide farmers in their switching 
decisions. When the growth in the number of organic farms stagnated in 2003, the government 
decided to use the income support instrument again in 2004. In 2005 a new hectare-based direct 
income support system was introduced. With the reduction in direct income support, provision of 
public services became relatively more important over time. In 1998 the Dutch government started 
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advertisement campaigns for organic products. Currently, more than half of the budget for stimulating 
organic farming is allocated to research, education and information dissemination.  
Both types of the above mentioned instruments have the same objective: stimulating the growth 
of the organic sector. Using farm level data from Sweden, Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) confirmed 
that direct payments and provision of public services are substitutes in the utility function of farmers 
considering switching to organic farming. In their paper they focus on farm-level decisions without 
taking risk explicitly into account. In a study on individual switching decisions Pietola and Oude 
Lansink (2001) did account for uncertainty in organic revenues. However, they only focused on the 
role of direct payments as a means of stimulating organic farming. Both aforementioned papers focus 
explicitly on farm-level decisions without taking the role of the government into account.  
In this paper a conceptual model is developed for determining a socially optimal per-hectare 
subsidy for any given level of public services. Farm heterogeneity, due to the variability of soil quality 
and management skills, is explicitly taken into account. Using an n-th price auction mechanism 
farmers indicate what is their reservation subsidy. The farm-level reservation subsidies are utilized by 
the government in its optimization problem. The structure of this auction mechanism motivates 
farmers to reveal their true reservation subsidies for switching to organic farming. The sensitivity of 
the socially optimal subsidy and of its associated level of organic farming to various parameters is also 
examined. The theoretical developments are applied to data from the province of Flevoland in the 
Netherlands. The empirical findings show that he level of per hectare socially optimal subsidy 
increases significantly with the elasticity of the social welfare function and decreases significantly 
with the degree of farmers’ heterogeneity in suitability of growing organic crops (OC) as well as with 
the level of complementary governmental services. The total area planted for OC is also quite sensitive 
to these parameters. The effects of the deadweight loss parameter and the degree of risk aversion on 
per hectare subsidy and on total organic acreage are relatively small. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two the conceptual framework is 
developed. In this section the farmers’ decision problem and the government optimization problem are 
defined. Also the n-th price auction as a mechanism for truthfully revealing reservation subsidies for 
switching is explained. Section 3 presents the data from the province of Flevoland in the Netherlands 
and the calibration of the empirical model. The results on optimal subsidy levels and its impact on the 
total area planted for organic crops are presented in section 4. Section five gives concluding remarks. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1 The farmer’s problem  
Assume an agricultural area of A hectares (ha), owned by a large number of farmers (M), each 
cultivating an area of a hectares, ( aM A= ). Based on observed behaviour of farmers we assume that 
all the land of a specific farm is utilised either for traditional crops (TC) or for organic crops (OC), for 
a predetermined time horizon of T years.1 We start the analysis with the assumption that currently 
(t=0) each one of the farmers grows TC, yielding an annual profit of 0W euros per farm, which is 
assumed to be fixed over time.  
The farmers vary with respect to skills and suitability of land for growing OC. Formally, we 
assume that the  specific characteristics of the thm farm(er) (hereafter farmer’s type) is denoted by 
[ , ], 1,...,m m Mθ θ θ∈ = , with cumulative distribution given by ( ) mF θ , ( ( ) 0,  and ( ) 1)F Fθ θ= = , 
and a strictly positive and differentiable density function ( )mf θ . The vector of farmers’ types is given 
by 1 2( , ,..., )Mθ θ θΘ = . The farmer’s type is private information and is not known to the government 
and to other farmers. 
The farmer considers the option to substitute the TC by OC. The profit associated with OC varies 
over time and is assumed to be random, due to combined variability in yields and prices. Padel & 
Lampkin (1994: 216) note that there is evidence for greater variability in crop yields with OC. Lack of 
opportunities to intervene with fertiliser or pesticides increases the risk of crop failure. Besides 
production risks, OC are also more prone to market risks. The small scale of organic markets could 
lead to greater fluctuations in demand and supply. Moreover, higher prices for OC may lead to a drop 
in demand in times of economic depression. In the absence of public intervention, the expected profits 
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per farm associated with the OC are lower than 0W  in the first few years of the planning horizon, and 
then it gradually increases until it exceeds 0W  before the end of this horizon.  
The government is interested in increasing the total area planted with OC because of the 
environment friendly production methods applied. It encourages farmers to switch to OC via a 
combination of two policy instruments. The first instrument is a direct compensation payment of 
( )s Θ  per ha planted with OC. Direct payments are paid to farmers only during the first tˆ T< years of 
the time horizon. This subsidy is equal for all farmers that decide to grow OC since differentiated 
subsidies are politically infeasible. The level of the subsidy is a function of the distribution of the types 
of farmers. The second instrument is public services of G euros for the whole organic sector. 
Examples of services relevant for our analysis include information gathering and disseminating, 
lowering transaction costs associated with the switch of activities, assisting in advertisement and 
marketing plans and more. Reduction of farm-level risks associated with the adoption of OC is a main 
contribution of these public services. Only farmers who choose to switch from TC to OC can benefit 
from these public services G.  
Let 1 1
,
( , ( ), ) ( ) ( )t m m m ts G G a sθ θ piΠ Θ = ⋅ + ⋅ Θ  be the profit per farm for OC in year t with mean 
and variance given by 
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respectively. Expected profit increases in both s and G, while the variance decreases in G. Recognising 
that a decision to switch to OC is a typical long-term decision and that there is variability in OC 
profits, it is assumed that farmers maximise the stream of utility of expected profits. We assume that 
each one of the farmers is risk averse with utility function ( )
m
U ⋅ defined on wealth which is 
increasing, twice differentiable and strictly concave ( ' 0, ' 0m mU U> < ). Since the paper does not 
focus on the role of risk and risk aversion, and in order to make the analysis more tractable, it is useful 
to approximate the expected utility from farm-level profits by a certainty equivalent profit defined by:  
 
 
1,CE 1 1
t,m , 0.5 ( )t m tVarγ piΠ = Π − ⋅ ⋅  (3) 
 
where ' ' 0
m m
U Uγ = − >  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The annual 
equivalent of the present value of the stream of future certainty equivalent profits for this case is given 
by 
 
 
ˆ
1 1
m
1
( ))W ( , ( ), ) [ ( ) 0.5 ( )] ( ) ,(1 )
t
m m m t
t
s
s G G V G aH r
r
piθ θ pi θ γ
=
ΘΘ = ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
+
  (4) 
 
where 
1
1
1 1
( )( )( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )
t
T T
t
t t
t t
V GGG H r V G H r
r r
pi
pi
pi
pi
= =
= ⋅ = ⋅
+ +
   , r is the annual real interest rate, and 
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is a capital recovery factor. Given the level of the policy instruments, ( )s Θ and 
G, 1m ( )W  is assumed to increase in the farmer’s type, namely:  
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It can be easily verified that 1m ( )W  increases in both, G and s.  
In the absence of governmental intervention, ( s =G=0),  it is assumed that 0 1m ( ) W W m> ∀  and 
for every [ , ].mθ θ θ∈  In other words, without governmental intervention none of the farmers in the 
region will quit growing TC and start growing OC instead. This assumption is in line with the 
observation that even with past policies promoting organic farming thus far only a small number of 
farmers switched to OC. 
For a given level of G, there exists a level of the annual-equivalent direct hectare payment ( )ms G , 
further denoted as reservation subsidy of the thm farmer, under which she is indifferent between the 
two types of crops: 
 
 
0 11( ) { [ ( ) 0.5 ( )]}m m ms G W G V G
a
piθ pi θ γ= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅  (6) 
 
Differentiating (6) with respect to the type of the farm, yields  
 
 
1
m{ / } { ( ) / } 0m m msign s sign Wθ θ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ <   (7a) 
 
(see (5))2 . Since 1( )t Gpi increases in G and ( )V Gpi decreases in G, it can be easily verified that  
 
 / 0,ms G∂ ∂ <  (7b)  
 
indicating that the two policy instruments are substitutes. 
Given the levels of the policy instruments, ( )s Θ and G, the farmer’s decision can be stated 
formally as follows  
  
 
1 0
m
1 0
m
If ( )  then ( , ) 1
If ( )  then ( , ) 0,
m
m
W W I s G
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 ≥ =

< =


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where ( , )mI s G is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the farmer decides to stop growing TC 
and switch to OC and equal to 0 if she decides not to adopt OC.  
For a given level of G, the total land area in the region that is planted for OC, is dependent on the 
actual level of s. For a formal formulation of this dependency it is convenient to use a graphical 
presentation. Based on (6) and (7a) and (7b), the set of reservation subsidies s  as a function of θ  is 
depicted in Figure 1 for two levels of public services. With actual annual subsidy of *s  €/ha all the 
farmers of type * *( , )s Gθ  and higher will start growing OC, while all other farmers will keep growing 
TC. Rewriting equation (6) for the “marginal farmer” with type * *( , )m s Gθ θ= and *ms s= allows for 
performing comparative statics, yielding: 
 
 
* * 2 * 2 * 2 *
* *2 * *0,  0,  0,  0,  and 0.G s s s G s
θ θ θ θ θ
γ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
< < > > <
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 (9) 
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The sign of 
*θ
γ
∂
∂
is indeterminate.  
θθθ
€ ha
*s
( )0s G
( )1s G
( )* * 0,s Gθ( )* * 1,s Gθ
0pi
1 0G G>
 
Figure 1. Type-dependent reservation subsidies for different levels of G and type-thresholds as 
functions of *s . 
 
 
The total land areas planted for OC and for TC are given by equations (10a) and (10b), respectively: 
 
 
* * *( , ) [1 ( ( , ))]OCTA s G A F s Gθ= −  (10a) 
 
              
* * *( , ) ( ( , ))TC OCTA s G AF s G A TAθ= = −  (10b) 
 
 
2.2 An optimal auction for revealing reservation subsidies for switching 
 The government’s job is to determine the levels of the public-input (G) and the (annual-
equivalent) direct payment, *s , that maximises its objective function (see below). However, 
[ , ]mθ θ θ∈  is a private information of the mth farmer and cannot be observed by the government (and 
neither by all other farmers). So, the government does not know which levels of s and G lead to a 
certain production of OC. Given the information asymmetry, farmers may have an incentive not to 
reveal their true type in order to obtain higher direct payments. So, the governmental support program 
should be designed as such that it provides an incentive to farmers who decide to join the program and 
grow OC, to report their reservation subsidy and (therefore indirectly their type) truthfully. In their 
study on conservation contracts Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) proposed using an 
auction as such a mechanism. The design of such an auction is extremely important. See Klemperer 
(2002) for an overview of issues. A sealed-bid auction is less prone to collusion among participants 
then an open auction. 
The second-price sealed-bid multiple object (Vickrey) auction and related forms have the 
advantage over first-price auctions that they are less susceptible to over- or underbidding because of 
the separation of the bid and the price (e.g., Krishna (2002), chapter 12). In other words, participants 
have an incentive to reveal their true values, in our case their true reservation subsidy for switching. 
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Note that in the discriminatory first-bid sealed auction proposed by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort (1997), where each participant receives his personal bid, farmers will not report their true 
reservation subsidies because of this tendency of overbidding. Shogren et al. (2001) indicate that a 
remaining problem with second-price auctions is that participants that expect their bids to be far from 
the auction outcome will not bid in a serious way. As a solution to this they propose the so-called nth-
price auction.  
The auction mechanism used in our setting is based on this nth-price auction and results in a 
uniform subsidy for all farmers that will participate in the end. This is because application of a system 
with differentiated subsidies per unit of land is expected to be politically infeasible and rejected as a 
non-equitable policy instrument. In this auction, the government offers multiple identical contracts to 
all farmers in the region. Specifically, each farmer who considers switching to organic farming is 
asked to report the level of her “reservation subsidy,” ( )ms G , for a few predetermined levels of public 
services, G. If the actual subsidy chosen by the government, *( , )s GΘ  is strictly greater than ( )ms G , 
farmer m is required to plant all of her land to OC instead of TC, and the government is required to 
pay her the uniform subsidy *( , )s GΘ . The reservation subsidy of the first unsuccessful bid is greater 
than or equal to *( , )s GΘ . In other words, *( , )s GΘ is lying strictly above the highest successful bid 
and below the lowest unsuccessful bid.  The difference with the nth-price sealed bid auction discussed 
by Shogren et al. (2001) is that the nth-price is not determined randomly but is the outcome of the 
government optimisation problem (see below). However, since the farmers do not and cannot know 
the outcome of the government optimisation problem for them it’s equal to a random nth-price 
auction.3 
 Shogren et al. (2001) proved that in the nth-price sealed bid auction it is optimal for all 
participants to bid their true reservation value. This proof is adopted for our analysis and can be 
summarised as follows. Define ASm as the surplus of the auction: 
 
 
( )1 * 0 *
*
( , ) ( ) ( , )
0 ( ) ( , )
m m
m
m
W s G W if s G s G
AS
if s G s G
 Θ − < Θ
= 
≥ Θ


 (11) 
 
In other words, if the farmer’s subsidy bid is strictly lower than the outcome of the auction, the 
farmer is in the program and earns a surplus. If the subsidy bid is higher than or equal to the final 
subsidy level, the farmer remains growing TC and his surplus is zero. Now what happens if a farmer 
overbids? In that case there is a chance that the final subsidy chosen by the government ( *( , )s GΘ ) 
will be higher, but only if the overbidding farmer is the first unsuccessful bid (she is then the one 
effectively raising the subsidy), which implies that the farmer will not participate, hurting herself. If 
the overbidding farmer is not the first unsuccessful bid the final subsidy is the same and it doesn’t 
affect ASm. The final subsidy can never be lower due to overbidding. What happens in the case of 
underbidding? Then there is a positive probability that the farmer is in the program, receiving a 
subsidy that is lower than her reservation subsidy, so the farmer would make a loss. If there is a higher 
first unsuccessful bid, the farmer will still receive this level, so underbidding would not affect the 
surplus. So, there is no reason for the farmer to overbid or underbid. In other words, truthful revelation 
is a strong dominating strategy for each farmer.  
 
2.3 Optimal Governmental Choice 
 The government wishes to maximise social surplus from agricultural production of traditional 
and organic crops. For a given level of G, the government’s optimisation problem can be formally 
stated as  
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where the threshold-type * *( , )s Gθ is determined by the type of the farmer with the highest successful 
bid (threshold-farmer), δ is the marginal deadweight loss from distortionary taxes of raising the 
government payments and [ ]J ⋅  is an increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable money-
metric social value function defined on total area planted for OC. For the ease of analysis, it is further 
assumed that mθ  is uniformly distributed, i.e. 
1( )  where mf θ θ θ θθ= ∆ = −∆ . 
Utilising Leibniz rule for differentiation of integrals, recalling that aM A= , and assuming an 
internal solution, the first order condition is: 
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* 1 0 * * 1 * *
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where 'J is the partial derivative of J  . Noting from equation (6) and Figure 1 that 
 
 
* 0 * 1 *1( ) { [ ( ) 0.5 ( )]} s G W G V G
a
piθ pi θ γ= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅  
 
and noting from (9) and (10a,b) that  
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the above first order condition can be rewritten as: 
 
   
*
* ' * * *
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( , )/ [ ( ( , )) (1 ) ] ( , ) 0
OC
OC OCTA s GSW s J TA s G s TA s G
s
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OC OC
OCTA s G TA s G sSW s J TA s G s
s s
δ∂ ∂ ⋅ ⋅∂ ∂ = ⋅ − − =
∂ ∂
 (14a) 
 
It can be easily verified that the second order condition, 2 *2/ 0SW s∂ ∂ <  is satisfied. Note that the 
condition in (14) can be satisfied only if ' * *( ( , )) (1 )OCJ TA s G sδ> + , as we assume hereafter. 
 The first term on the right hand side of (14a) is the marginal benefits to society from a marginal 
increase in the subsidy per hectare planted for OC. Specifically, it is equal to the increase in the 
number of hectares enrolled in the program, 
*
*
( , )OCTA s G
s
∂
∂
, times the net marginal benefits of an 
additional hectare planted for OC. The latter is equal to the marginal increase in the social value 
function, ' *( ( , ))OCJ TA s G , minus *( )s G which equals the marginal loss of farm income due to the 
substitution of TC by OC (see (6)). The second term on the right hand side of (14a) is the marginal 
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increase in the total dead-weight loss from distortionary taxes of raising tax revenues to support the 
government payment.   
 
 2.4 Comparative statics 
Let *s be the subsidy level that solves (14). In this subsection we conduct analyse the comparative 
statics of the model via complete differentiation of (14) with respect to ,  ,  , and  G θ δ γ∆ and 
utilisation of (9) and (13). The results are detailed below where (-) and (+) represents negative and 
positive signs, respectively:  
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To evaluate the impact of θ θ θ∆ ≡ −  note that it can be increased by either increasing 
 by (>0)θ ε , decreasing θ by (>0)ε  or making both changes simultaneously.  We choose to apply 
the third alternative, which implies a mean preserving spread in the distribution of farmers’ types. 
Specifically, we assume that [ , ] 2 .θ θ ε θ ε θ θ θ ε∈ − + → ∆ = − +  The mean, the variance and the 
cumulative density function of θ  are given by ( ) / 2,  ( ) ( 2 ) /12E Varθ θ θ θ θ θ ε= + = − +  and 
( ) ( ) /( 2 )F θ θ θ ε θ θ ε= − + − + , respectively. An increase in ε  increases θ∆ and the variance but 
does not affect the mean. It can be easily verified that sign{ } { 2 }F sign θ θ θ
ε
∂
= + −
∂
 is positive 
(negative) if * Eθ θ≤  ( * Eθ θ> ). If * *( , )s Gθ is smaller than the mean of θ , (implying that in the 
optimal solution, more than 50% of the total area is planted to OC), the sign of OCTA ε∂ ∂  becomes 
positive and the impact of * on sε  is positive. However, if *θ is larger than Eθ , the sign of 
OCTA ε∂ ∂  is indeterminate and the impact of * on sε  becomes indeterminate:  
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 (15b) 
  
The impacts of marginal dead-weight loss is   
 
 
*
*
*
0
OC
OCs TAsign sign s TA
sδ
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= − ⋅ − <   ∂ ∂ 	  	
 (15c) 
 
The impact of the absolute measure of risk aversion depends, among other things, on the sign of  
OCTA γ∂ ∂ , which is expected to be negative. Assuming that this sign is indeed negative, we get 
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3. Data and calibration of the empirical model 
The theoretical model developed in section 2 is applied using data from the province of Flevoland 
in the Netherlands. The area consists of about 80000 ha of land used for arable farming, which is about 
75% of the total agricultural land in the area. The soil type in the region is clay which is suitable for 
organic farming. So, agronomic conditions do not prevent farmers from switching. In the region there 
are already a number of organic arable farms.  
To calibrate the model, data of specialized arable farms covering the period 1990-1999 are used. 
These data are obtained from the Dutch farm accounting data network (FADN) operated by WUR-
LEI. The dataset consists of 110 traditional farms having 473 observations in total and 22 organic 
farms with 90 observations. These observations are used to calculate mean ( 1( )Gpi ) and variance 
( ( )V Gpi ) used in the model. The values for A, a and W0, were also directly calculated using the data at 
hand. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (γ ) is based on an estimated unit-free 
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.20 using the same data for traditional arable farmers (Oude 
Lansink, 1999). Dividing by the average profits per organic farm (1.77), gives a measure of of 0.113.  
The deadweight loss parameter (δ ) is based on a study by Alston and Hurd (1990) who argue that the 
marginal social welfare cost of spending is between 0.20 and 0.50. We took the average value of 0.35.  
The parameter values are reported in Table 1. 
The application additionally requires the specification of the governmental social-value function 
( )OCJ TA and the calibration of a few parameters. Recalling that J is assumed to be an increasing, 
strictly concave and twice differentiable function of ( )  where 0 1,OCJ TA α α= < <  is the elasticity 
of the social-value function from the area planted for OC.  
In the absence of data on the parametersθ , θ  and α  we calibrated them as follows: 
1. First, based on our data set we assumed the lowest level of the certainty equivalent profits 
per-farm (without a subsidy) in the region to be 0.4x105 € per farm. Namely, (see (4)) 
1[ ( ) 0.5 ( )] 0.4G V Gpiθ pi θ γ⋅ − ⋅ = . Substituting for 1( ),   and ( )G V Gpipi γ  (Table 1), yields 
0.3.θ =  
2. Second, givenθ , we utilized the actual level of subsidy in 1999 ( * 227s = € /ha ) and 
equation (6) to calculate its corresponding level of *θ . Then, given *θ , we utilized the 
actual area in the region planted for OC in 1999 ( 5097OCTA = ha) and equation (10a), 
( * * *( , ) [1 ( ( , ))]OCTA s G A F s Gθ= − ),  to calibrate for ( 0.90)θ = . The remaining parameter 
to be calibrated is α  
3. Finally, we utilized the specification of the governmental social-value function J , 
substituted 1' ( )OCJ TA αα −=  into the first order condition for optimal subsidy in (14) to 
calibrate for ( 0.433).α =   
The calibrated values are also reported in Table 1.  
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Table 1.  Basic parameter values. 
Parameter Description Units Value 
A Total size of arable land in the province of Flevoland Hectares 80,000 
a  Average size of arable farm in the area Hectares 48.5 
0W  Average annual profits of traditional farms 105  € of 1999 1.25 
1( )Gpi  Annual equivalent of stream of future certainty equivalent profits 105  € of 1999 1.358 
( )V Gpi  Average variance of profits   0.724 
γ  Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
 
0.113 
δ  Deadweight loss parameter  0.35 
θ  Lower bound for type  0.30 
θ  Upper bound for type  0.90 
α  Coefficient of exponential function for J 
 
0.433 
 
4. Results 
This section describes the results of the sensitivity analysis performed with the empirical model. 
This analysis shows the changes in the optimal solution of the government’s problem if one of the 
parameters changes while the others are kept constant. This indicates the relative importance of 
differences in specific model parameters. The results of the sensitivity analysis are given in table 2. 
The direction of the results are in line with the comparative statistics of section 2.4. Therefore, interest 
is more on the size of the effects caused by different values for individual model parameters. Note that 
in calculating total social welfare (SW) the deadweight loss associated with public expenditure on G is 
not taken into account. The reason for this is that there is no data available on yearly expenditure on G.  
 
Table 2. Results of sensitivity analysis. 
Scenarios Area of OC 
planted 
 
 TAOC  (ha) 
Subsidy 
per ha 
 s  
(€/ha) 
 
Total 
subsidy 
OCTA s⋅   
(105 €) 
Deadweight 
loss  
 
(105 €) 
SW from 
OC*  
  
(105 €) 
SW from 
TC** 
 
 (105 €) 
Total 
SW*** 
 
(105 €) 
 
Base-case 5097 227.00 11.57 4.05 158.60 1930.48 2089.08 
0.5α =  9861 321.95 31.75 11.11 320.28 1807.70 2127.98 
0.65α =  41,186 951.69 391.96 137.19 1702.04 1000.37 2702.41 
0.25γ =  3831 279.42 10.70 3.75 121.23 1963.11 2084.34 
0.50δ =  4495 215.01 9.66 4.85 141.50 1946.00 2087.50 
1( ) 10%
( ) 10%
G
V Gpi
pi ↑
↓  10,724 104.54 11.21 3.92 329.54 1785.47 2115.01 
1( ) 5%
( ) 10%
G
V Gpi
pi ↑
↓  7770 156.98 12.20 4.27 238.49 1861.59 2100.08 
1( ) 10%
( ) 5%
G
V Gpi
pi ↑
↓  10,660 105.59 11.26 3.94 327.52 1787.10 2114.62 
0.20
1.00
θ
θ
=
=
 9508 112.62 10.71 3.75 295.29 1816.80 2112.09 
0.40
0.80
θ
θ
=
=
 2042 418.52 8.55 2.99 68.47 2009.23 2077.70 
*
 Social welfare from OC is calculated as 
*
1
( , )
 [ ( ) 0.5 ( )] ( ) ( , ) [ ( , )]OC OC
s G
M G V G f d TA G s s J TA G s
θ
pi
θ
θ pi θ γ θ θ δ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ +

    
**
 Social welfare from TC is calculated as 0( , ) ( / )TCTA G s W a⋅  
***  Actual social welfare should be somewhat lower since the calculation does not take the deadweight loss on G into 
account.  
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The second and third rows of table 2 show that different values of α, the elasticity of the social 
welfare function with respect to area planted with OC, have a significant impact on the socially 
optimal outcome. With an elasticity of 0.5 instead of the original 0.433 that reflects the current 
valuation of OC by the government, the optimal per hectare subsidy goes up by 41.8%, to 321.95 and 
the area planted with OC nearly doubles. Since more utility is derived from OC and the deadweight 
loss of the higher subsidy increases only slightly, social welfare goes up about 2%. When α is set to 
0.65, the optimal subsidy and area planted increase dramatically. Not surprisingly, total social welfare 
is high despite the relatively large deadweight loss. Also note that total subsidy is about 34 times as 
high as in the base scenario. From this two simulations we can learn that the optimal subsidy level 
depends very much on the social valuation of OC by the government. 
A higher degree of risk aversion among farmers has some mixed effects as shown by the results 
for 0.25γ = , which is more than twice the base Arrow-Pratt coefficient4. Since farmers are more risk 
averse, they consider the risky OC as less attractive reflected by higher reservation subsidies s . These 
overall higher reservation subsidies lead to a higher subsidy of 279 set by government and a total 
acreage of 3831, which is of course lower than the base acreage. Note that because of the higher 
subsidy per hectare and less hectares converted, total subsidies do not decrease much. Also the welfare 
effects are low.  
A higher deadweight loss parameter δ  leads to a lower optimal subsidy level as expected from 
equation (15c). The effects are however relatively small, with the subsidy only 12 euros less per 
hectare and only 500 hectares less converted to OC. Social welfare levels are also not affected much, 
so we can say that the level of deadweight loss does not have a big impact on the results. 
It is assumed that 1( )t Gpi increases in G and ( )V Gpi decreases in G. But, lack of yearly data on G 
it was not possible to quantify the relationships between G and 1( )t Gpi  and ( )V Gpi empirically, e.g. 
using regression techniques. However, in order to examine how changes in G can affect the optimal 
social outcome, we increased 1( )t Gpi  by 10% and decreased ( )V Gpi by 10%. Interestingly, the results 
are rather sensitive to this change. The final subsidy is more than halved and the area planted with OC 
more than doubled. In order to know whether these dramatic effects are due to the increase in 
1( )t Gpi or the decrease in ( )V Gpi , we did analysed two more scenarios. In the first, 1( )t Gpi  only rose 
by 5% and ( )V Gpi  still decreased by 10%. In the second we turned the effects the other way around. 
From these two scenarios it follows that changes in ( )V Gpi do not have a big effect on the results. 
Shifts in optimal subsidy and area planted are mainly due to changes in average profits.  
Finally, we applied a mean-preserving spread on the uniform distribution of θ. First, we widened 
the range of θ, implying more heterogeneity in suitability of growing OC. This results in a bigger 
spread in the set of reservation subsidies. The optimal subsidy is now only 112.62, but more than nine 
and half thousand hectares are grown with organic crops. Less heterogeneity in the types has the 
opposite effect as shown by the last row of table 2. With an optimal subsidy of 418.52 euros per 
hectare, still only 2042 hectares are grown with organic. The small acreage for OC leads to low social 
welfare from OC and low overall social welfare. From these results it follows that suitability of 
growing organic crops has a big impact on switching decisions.          
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper develops a model to determine the optimal mix of a direct income support policy and 
providing public services both aimed at stimulating organic farming. Direct income support has a 
positive effect on the income of farmers that grow organic crops, whereas the public services both 
raise income and reduce the variability of yearly revenues. Heterogeneous suitability for growing 
organic crops is explicitly taken into account. An important element is the inclusion of a nth-price 
auction that induces farmers to truthfully reveal their reservation subsidy for switching to organic 
crops. The theoretical model is applied using data from the province of Flevoland in the Netherlands. 
Conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are that the optimal direct per hectare subsidy is 
decreasing in the provision of general services, decreasing in the spread of types of farmers, 
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decreasing in the marginal deadweight loss and increasing in the elasticity of the social welfare 
function as well as in the absolute measure of risk aversion.  
We believe that the suggested mechanism to elicit the truthful revelation of farmers’ reservation 
subsidies for various levels of complementary public services is simple to apply and can be operated at 
low costs. Moreover, the information acquired by the government will enables her to improve the 
decision making process relative to the current situation under which subsidy levels are set in an ad-
hoc fashion. 
Obviously, the analysis is partial and includes a few caveats and simplified assumptions. 
Quantifying the relationships between the mean and variance of profits from growing OC and the 
provision of public services, identifying and estimating the parameters of the distribution of farmers’ 
types and explicitly accounting for variable land size, are directions into which the current analysis can 
be profitably extended.  
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Endnotes 
1
 The option to switch back and forth between crops is rejected a priori since this would lead to repeated losses in 
yields and investments made. 
2
 To guarantee that /m ms θ∂ ∂ is negative for the whole range of 'm sθ values we assume that 
1( ) / ( ).G V Gpiθ pi γ≤  
3
 Since there are many/multiple farmers participating it is impossible for any farmer to know all the bids of the 
other farmers in order to mimic the government optimization problem. 
4
 Since the values for θ  and θ were calibrated using 0.113γ = , we also did a sensitivity analysis with higher γ and 
recalibrated values for θ  and θ . Although the results differed in size, the directions were similar. 
 
   
